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BALANCING INTERESTS AND MAXIMIZING RIGHTS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE*
Tseming Yang"
Environmental justice has gained significant attention as a social
movement only since the early 1980's. This attention was prompted in part
by highly publicized protests and acts of civil disobedience against the siting
of a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) disposal facility in a predominately
African-American and poor community in Warren County, North Carolina.'
The activists in the Warren County incident recognized that traditional
environmental protection approaches which sought to minimize overall
pollution, but failed to adequately consider the distributional consequences of
such efforts, could not be relied upon to protect their communities.2 Several
high-profile reports, published in the wake of the Warren County events,
studied the racial impacts of siting hazardous waste facilities and seemed to
confirm such charges of discrimination against minority groups and the poor.3
This realization should not have come as a surprise. Pollution sources
such as industrial facilities provide many important economic benefits to
society. Accordingly, the approaches to regulating such pollution sources
have generally attempted to capture the maximum amount of those benefits by
balancing them against the environmental and public health costs of the
pollution generated. Unfortunately, the distributional impacts on racial
minority and poor communities and the environmental and public health costs
imposed by such regulatory decisions have rarely, if at all, entered into
governmental decision-making. Poor and minority communities, left without
adequate recourse under the environmental regulatory scheme for claims of
unfair and inequitable burdens,4 looked to the strategies and tactics of the civil
rights movement as a model for vindicating their grievances, thus leading to
the emergence of the modem environmental justice movement.
* An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Vermont Law Review's Environmental
Justice Symposium on October 24, 1998.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I would like to thank Richard Albores for
valuable comments and Nick Goldstein for additional research assistance. Any errors remain my own.
I. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, As in the '60s, Protesters Rally; But this Time the Foe is PCB,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1982, at Al.
2. See id.
3. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, SITNG OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS ON SURROUNDING
COMMUmnEs (1983); COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, ToxIc WASTES AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).
4. In fact, some environmental justice activists blame environmental statutes themselves as one
of the major causes of environmental injustice. See, e.g., Luke Cole, Empowerment as the Key to
Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 646 (1992).
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While environmental justice as a movement is of relatively recent origin,
legal academic attention to it, however intense now, is generally of an even
more recent vintage.5 In fact, it is the novelty of the field that has been the
impetus for legal scholarship concerning environmental justice. Much of it
has focused on the utility, or in many minds the inadequacies, of the civil
rights approach to environmental justice problems. Yet, as the intersection of
civil rights and environmental law, it is technically not a new area of law, and
neither litigation nor development of legal doctrine in this area occurs in a
vacuum. The principles of civil rights and environmental law continue to
apply, as environmental justice advocates have learned the hard way through
their experiences with the first few cases that raised civil rights claims to
vindicate grievances.6
In this Essay, I would like to offer some thoughts about the differing
nature of adjudication and discourse in these two areas of the law. In
particular, I will focus on the role that maximizing rights and balancing
interests have had in approaches to decision-making about civil rights and our
environment. These approaches can be termed in short "rights-maximizing"
and "interest-balancing," respectively.7 This task, I think, is not just of
academic interest. A better understanding of these differences will, I hope,
give us insights into the law governing environmental justice issues as well as
the future of environmental justice litigation. In particular, the mismatch in
approaches explains, in part, the lack of success that civil rights claims have
encountered in the environmental context. Understanding the rights-
maximizing and interest-balancing dichotomy can provide us with insight into
why some litigation approaches to environmental justice issues might not be
as successful as others, and allow us to make some tentative suggestions about
more successful ones.8 Of course, it cannot answer all questions since much
depends on the individual context. However, it can serve as a valuable
analytical tool. While I utilize some of the insights gained from understanding
this mismatch to criticize some recent EPA actions and to suggest some
5. See Peter Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41
U. KAN. L. REV. 271, 285-87 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979);
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp.
880 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (1 th Cir. 1989); R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va.
1991).
7. These terms are not my own creation but adopted from Paul Gewirtz. See Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588-89 (1983) (examining school desegregation litigation in
the wake of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
8. There are, of course, other important structural differences between civil rights law and
environmental law. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Race(tal) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20
ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 739-44 (1993) (contrasting the differing conceptions and approaches to harm). A more
comprehensive treatment of this topic will be presented in a paper I am currently preparing.
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avenues for improving environmental decision-making to address
environmental justice concerns, in particular through explicit consideration of
incommensurable values and interests such as autonomy and community
preservation, I do not intend to offer a fully formed theory or comprehensive
treatment of all potential approaches available to address environmental
justice concerns.
Rights-maximizing and interest-balancing are both familiar concepts in
the law. In broad terms, rights-maximizing means just that-choosing the
most effective means for maximizing the implementation of a right. Paul
Gewirtz has described this as an approach to adjudication in which the court,
once it has found a violation of a right, orders a remedy that will be most
effective at redressing the rights violation, regardless of the cost to the
wrongdoer or others.9 In contrast, interest-balancing considers the costs and
burdens that a remedy imposes on others, whether on innocent third-parties or
on the wrongdoer himself, to determine whether a remedy is appropriate.'"
While Gewirtz considered these concepts only in the context of judicial
adjudication of school desegregation litigation," they can be applied more
broadly to situations outside of judicial adjudication, such as governmental
decision-making.
In this context, the terms "rights" and "interests" refer to the strength of
the protection they afford their holders. Thus, roughly, rights in this context
can be thought of as important individual interests that the law has decided are
worthy of special attention and protection by the government, and that
generally are of much greater importance than other interests. 2 In the case of
9. See Gewirtz, supra note 7, at 591.
10. See id.
II. See id. at 588.
12. Ronald Dworkin's formulation, which I think is helpful here, denotes these two concepts as
political rights and goals (interests in my terminology), and distinguishes "rights from goals by fixing on
the distributional character of claims about rights." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 91
(1977). Thus,
an individual has a right to some opportunity or resource or liberty if it counts in
favor of a political decision that the decision is likely to advance or protect the state
of affairs in which he enjoys the right, even when no other political aim is served
and some political aim is disserved thereby, and counts against that decision that it
will retard or endanger that state of affairs, even when some other political aim is
thereby served. A goal is a nonindividuated political aim, that is, a state of affairs
whose specification does not in this way call for any particular opportunity or
resource or liberty for particular individuals.
Id. Of course, the difference between rights and interests is not as stark in practical reality as one may
think. Rights are not without limits and may be curtailed by other rights and on occasion even by "mere"
interests. See id. at 92. For instance, a right may not necessarily be absolute or always override mere
interests, denoted "collective goals" in Ronald Dworkin's framework. However, a right could not "be
defeated by appeal to any of the ordinary routine goals of political administration, but only by a goal of
special urgency." Id. Thus, a right is superior and of a different kind from a mere interest because "it
1999]
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civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as rights against self-
incrimination or equal protection, the late Supreme Court Justice Hugo L.
Black argued that such protections are absolute. 3 However, like Gewirtz, I
am less interested here in the fine distinction between rights and interests, or
what is exactly protected by a particular right, than in the general conceptual
contrasts and the difference in how our legal system and government agencies
treat them by either single-mindedly maximizing one in its application or
balancing them against each other. 4
Using these delineations, civil rights law can generally be described by
a rights-maximizing approach. Remedies to a rights violation are chosen for
their effectiveness in vindicating that right. For example, in the school
desegregation context, remedies to racially discriminatory school segregation
practices have included mandating affirmative desegregation efforts. 5 This
should not come as a surprise since civil rights law is driven in large part by
equal protection jurisprudence and the constitutional significance of the
issues." In contrast, environmental law can generally be described by an
interest-balancing approach to resolving conflicts. 7 This is evidenced by the
various considerations and factors that go into environmental decision-
making, which usually include economic costs and benefits, technological
feasibility, or more generally the "reasonableness" of a measure. 8
These differences stem in part from the historical backgrounds as well as
the intrinsically different nature of the two areas of law. The most obvious
and straightforward difference to point out, but probably the least useful for
analytical purposes, is the simple fact that both areas of law are governed by
different statutory schemes and are affected differently by constitutional
cannot be outweighed by all social goals." Id.
13. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 867, 873 (1960).
14. Of course, rights-maximizing and interest-balancing also do not represent as neat a dichotomy
as the terms might suggest. Rather, they may be thought of as representing two ends of a spectrum. In fact,
even constitutional rights can be overridden, i.e. "balanced," in certain circumstances. For instance, a
compelling state interest may override anti-discrimination protections under the Equal Protection Clause.
See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987) (discussing prevalence of balancing in constitutional adjudication).
15. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
16. In this context, the term civil rights refers generally to anti-discrimination protections primarily
provided for by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
17. Interest-balancing is the dominant mode of governmental decision-making, which needs to
consider and is responsible for a multitude of interests. However, the challenge that the environmental
justice movement presents to this mode of decision-making is unusual.
18. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 301(b)(2)(A)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994) ("requir[ing]
application of the best available technology economically achievable.., which will result in reasonable
further progress"). These characterizations of environmental law and civil rights law are not uniformly true.
Nevertheless, I think that they are sufficiently accurate to provide a useful model for the purposes of this
Essay.
[Vol. 23:529
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provisions. More enlightening causes for the dichotomy can be found in the
deeper structural differences. While a full discussion of these structural
differences is beyond the scope of this Essay, I would like to address five key
illustrative factors.
The first factor relates to the differing subject groups of concern. Civil
rights laws, and particularly the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause, have traditionally concerned themselves with vindicating the rights of
racial minorities and other groups that generally have been the subject of
discrimination. Thus, civil rights laws protect individuals from the vagaries
of majority rule by imposing limits on how members of traditionally excluded
or discriminated groups are burdened or disadvantaged by majority decisions.
To achieve this purpose, civil rights laws must take a rights-maximizing
approach. Otherwise, the majority could always balance away the rights of
the minority.
In contrast, environmental law's general focus on market failures and its
causes has required an entirely different paradigm. In this context, it was not
a minority group that needed to be protected. Rather, it was the interests of
society at large, the "majority," that needed protection from the irresponsible
and at times unscrupulous actions of individuals and companies destroying the
environment. In fact, under Garret Hardin's classic explanation of the
"tragedy of the commons" problem, rational economic actors had no
incentives to limit their use of or to act responsibly with regard to common
resources. 9 Thus, protecting the rights of individuals and small groups was
not of paramount concern, and was actually antithetical to the goals of
environmental protection laws. Decision-making approaches that relied on
balancing the interests of individuals against those of society at large were the
natural result.
The second factor relevant to the predominance of interest-balancing in
environmental law, unlike in civil rights law, relates to the difficult issues of
causation and risk impacts that environmental problems present. When
decisions are made utilizing cost-benefit analysis or risk assessment, and the
impacts of particular environmental standards or pollution levels are measured
in X number of increases in the incidence of cancer, or Y probability of
reproductive damage to workers, or Z amounts of dollars lost in future
earnings, the people who are affected are represented only by those numbers
in a spreadsheet or figures on a notepad. The very disconnect between agency
actions and their impacts on the people affected due to the attenuated
causation chain and their anonymity in this analysis, weakens any moral
outrage that such harm might otherwise generate. It also makes it that much
19. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
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easier to justify and balance adverse health impacts, such as increases in the
rates of cancer or mortality, against the apparent potential benefits of jobs and
tax revenue. Therefore, probabilistic causation undercuts rights claims by
those affected because of the difficulty of proving a direct causal relationship
between actual harm to those rights and the government decision.
A third factor relates back to the historical background of our modem
environmental regulatory scheme and our current acceptance of the necessity
for pollution. Because we want to maintain our standard of living, it has been
our assumption for a long time, and unquestioned by a large majority, that
some environmental degradation and pollution are an acceptable and
necessary part of life. Thus, the question has traditionally turned away from
how we can prevent pollution altogether and instead has focused on how much
pollution should be curtailed or controlled. Most.strikingly, loss of human life
and harm to health was in large part viewed as a cost of business, to be kept
within certain limits, but not to be eliminated at all costs. That, of course, has
been one of the key complaints by environmental justice activists to traditional
approaches to environmental protection.2" While that assumption is changing
slowly, our support and acceptance of the benefits, including jobs and a
comfortable life style, of the underlying economic system is in many ways in
tension with claims of rights to a healthy and decent environment. After all,
so the argument goes, some pollution is the cost of our standard of living.
Having thus undercut our ability to use claims of rights to challenge the
assumption that pollution and environmental degradation is necessary,
government officials, judges, and even communities bearing the brunt of
pollution, are frequently left only with arguments about fair balancing of
benefits and burdens as credible tools of persuasion.
The fourth factor relevant to the rights-maximizing and interest-balancing
dichotomy is the regulatory structure of civil rights and environmental
protection. The regulatory structure of civil rights, if one can call it a
regulatory structure, consists largely of enforcement through the independent
judicial system, where access to the decision-maker and the process is
carefully controlled. Of course, there are federal agencies such as the federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that provide some administrative
avenues to address discrimination. However, in large part, most would agree
that such remedies are not as important as the judicial avenues. The many
broad congressional delegations of authority over the environment to federal
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
importance and pervasiveness of federal agency efforts in environmental
20. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 3, 11-12 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); Cole,
supra note 4, at 64445.
[Vol. 23:529
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protection stand in stark contrast. This structure focuses lobbying and
political pressure by industry and other special interest groups on the
particular agency in an effort to influence its exercise of congressionally
delegated authority in one fashion or another. While one certainly cannot
describe, for instance, EPA as an agency that is captured by regulated
interests, a severe form of regulatory failure,2' other effects may result such
as regulatory paralysis or delay. In the context of legal doctrines that extend
a significant amount ofjudicial deference to an agency's decisions,' it should
come as no surprise that a rights-maximizing approach would be impossible
to implement. The many competing demands, legitimate or not, would simply
not allow for a single-interest agency focus-for example, one that puts
human health protection above jobs, industrial development, or other desirable
and "reasonable" goals. Interest-balancing would be a natural default. The
pathological implications of this tension have been discussed in great detail
by John Dwyer, in the context of past congressional attempts to pursue health-
based approaches, such as to air pollution controls in the Clean Air Act, and
the inability of EPA to implement such approaches.
The fifth factor concerns the expertise-driven nature of environmental
protection efforts. As Eileen Gauna has elaborated in a recent article, the
technical knowledge requirements for understanding and controlling pollution
effects disempower ordinary citizens, who usually do not possess the relevant
technical background. 4 Yet, in order to maintain an effective legal scheme
that is rights-maximizing, broad public knowledge and awareness of
individual rights and rights violations are necessary. Otherwise, violations
cannot be readily detected and redressed, nor publicized as an important
political and moral issue for government officials to address, as was done by
the civil rights movement. The broad public vigilance necessary to protect
rights and maintain a rights-maximizing approach is not present. This is true
despite the important citizen suit provisions in the environmental statutes that
are intended to facilitate private citizen concern and involvement.'
21. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1669, 1684-87 (1975); see also JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
CITIZEN ACTION 60-61 (1972). An extreme instance of regulatory capture may be an agency that is
systematically controlled by the businesses that it was designed to regulate. See Stewart, supra at 1685.
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA), (E), (F) (1994); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
23. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 234-36
(1990) (positing that the inability of EPA to implement such approaches is in part due to industry lobbying
and the perceived reasonableness of the conflicting interests).
24. See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 32-36 (1998).
25. Again, this is not an issue that can be dealt with in any satisfactory detail in this short Essay.
However, the apparent high proportion of environmental citizen suits brought by environmental groups,
1999]
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But what is the relevance of this dichotomy? After all, while it might be
academically interesting to consider these differences, do they really matter
to us in the real world? I would like to believe that they do.
Equal protection litigation illuminates this issue. The failure of equal
protection claims in the courtroom has been blamed primarily on the vagaries
of the equal protection doctrine, and in particular on the discriminatory intent
requirement and the attendant difficulties of proof. This assessment is nothing
new and is a lesson well-learned by environmental justice activists by now.
Yet, this perspective is also too near-sighted and insufficiently considers the
significant influence of the interest-balancing paradigm on environmental
decision-making. I would posit that interest-balancing has had a major impact
on making the elements of the equal protection doctrine so difficult to
satisfy.26 Because interest-balancing introduces so many different and
important factors into the decision-making process, the court's task of
isolating and finding a discriminatory intent is made that much more difficult.
In its existing form, environmental decision-making usually requires
consideration of economic costs, health effects, technological feasibility, and
ecological effects. Accordingly, it is easy to see how a court could find non-
discriminatory justifications for upholding a governmental decision regardless
of the existence of discrimination evidence.27 Abolishing the discriminatory
intent doctrine, as some have suggested as a solution, while very attractive,
would not solve this problem.
On the other hand, this analysis also suggests that if we can find claims
within environmental law that are more similar to how civil rights claims are
dealt with (through a rights-maximizing approach), there may be a greater
chance of success. In fact, in spite of the prevalence of interest-balancing
within environmental law, there are some claims that generally are not subject
to interest-balancing. They include claims for violations of procedural
requirements, such as opportunities for public participation arising under the
federal Administrative Procedures Act2 or other procedural statutes, such as
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).29  Generally, such
who can draw on the necessary expert resources, as opposed to private individuals, ought to be ample
illustration.
26. See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979);
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp.
880 (M.D. Ga.), aft'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (1 lth Cir. 1989); R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va.
1991).
27. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
28. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1994).
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
[Vol. 23:529
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participation rights and procedural requirements must be strictly observed and
are thus not subject to interest-balancing."
The use of procedural claims to achieve substantive outcomes is not new
in environmental advocacy. Traditional environmental organizations have
made use of them for a long time. In California, the Kettleman City
community's success in stopping the siting of a hazardous waste incinerator
in their midst has proven that such tools can be adopted for use in
environmental justice litigation.3'
But this analysis also allows for other more forward-looking conclusions.
Some have looked to EPA's administrative Title VI complaint process as a
source of great hope for vindicating environmental justice claims." Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"3 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or national origin by programs that receive federal financial
assistance.34 In the EPA context, such recipients are oftentimes state and local
governments. Title VI further charges federal agencies with drafting
implementing regulations. In the typical context, an EPA Title VI
discrimination complaint would allege discriminatory effects resulting from
the issuance of pollution control permits by state and local governmental
agencies that receive EPA funding.
Under EPA's Title VI administrative regulations no finding of
discriminatory intent is required to make a case for disparate impact
discrimination.36 This would appear to resolve complaints about the equal
protection doctrine's intent requirement as the barrier to successful civil rights
suits. However, the analysis here suggests that hope for EPA's existing Title
VI procedures as the solution for environmental justice claims may be
30. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Of course, procedural rights are just that-procedural as opposed
to substantive rights. However, traditional environmental organizations have demonstrated how well such
procedural rights can be used to achieve substantive environmental outcomes.
31. See Ruling on Submitted Matter, El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings,
No. 366045 (Super. Ct. Cal. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND JUSTICE: READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE 150
(1995); see also Cole, supra note 4, at 674-79 & n.255.
32. See, e.g., Steven Light & Kathryn Rand, Is Title VIIa Magic Bullet?: Environmental Racism
in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5 & n. 10 (1996).
33. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (1994).
34. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. § 2000d. Title VI itself has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court to prohibit intentional discrimination only. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
293 (1985). However, the Supreme Court has also ruled that Title VI authorizes federal agencies, including
EPA, to adopt implementing regulations that prohibit discriminatory effects, since policies and practices
that are neutral on their face can nevertheless have the effect of discriminating. See id. at 292-94.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
36. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998).
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misplaced. Irrespective of EPA's genuine and good faith efforts in
implementing its Title VI administrative process, it seems doubtful to me that
it will be able to overcome the pitfalls of the interest-balancing paradigm."
Thus, even though the anti-discrimination objectives of Title VI inherently
represent a form of rights-maximizing, they nevertheless remain in significant
tension with EPA's other interest-balancing duties.38
One past example of the force of this tension can be seen in the treatment
of the Clean Water Act's original toxics provisions, section 307."9 Section
307
originally was premised on a harm-based regulatory strategy that
required health-based determinations-such as how risky water
pollutants are. By the middle 1970s, it became clear that the EPA
was not promulgating many toxic water pollutant standards. A
[litigation] compromise was reached with the [Natural Resources
Defense Council] in which 65 non-regulated toxic substances
would be controlled on a technology-based approach: that is, for
different categories of industries, what sort of technology was the
best available. A few more toxic pollutants were later added to the
list so that now there are slightly in excess of 100 regulated on the
basis of best-available technology. This technology-based approach
was approved by Congress in 1977 when the Clean Water Act was
amended. At that time, Congress also specified that more stringent
health-based regulations could be enacted for hazardous water
pollutants. Unfortunately, over the ensuing thirteen years the EPA
has developed no such regulations.4°
37. Environmental justice grassroots activists have long been aware of the pervasiveness of the
interest-balancing paradigm in the environmental legal structure and how it has co-opted even the thinking
of traditional environmental organizations devoted to protecting the environment as their mission. Thus,
Mainstream environmental organizations from the Sierra Club to the World Wildlife
Fund and the Environmental Defense Fund have become part of "the system" where
being "reasonable" is the driving force, and there is little consideration of the impact
on people. These organizations are staffed primarily by scientists, lawyers,
economists and political lobbyists. Although many of these groups may have an
adversarial relationship with agencies such as the EPA their differences are
frequently of degree rather than substance, with an emphasis on tightening or
enforcing existing laws rather than developing a new approach.
Cole, supra note 4, at 638 n.60 (quoting Penny Newman).
38. In this respect, my reason for doubting the efficacy of Title VI differs from others who consider
environmental justice problems primarily solvable only by political processes. See, e.g., Light & Rand,
supra note 32, at 6. While I do not disagree with the importance of political activism, I believe that judicial
solutions are equally important to resolving environmental justice problems.
39. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, §
307(a)(1), 86 Stat. 816, 856 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1994)).
40. Howard A. Latin, Proceedings and Papers of the Conference on Environmental Law: Air
Pollution Control in the 1990s-Learningfrom Past Mistakes, 1990 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 125, 125; see also
[Vol. 23:529
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That same difficulty has also exhibited itself in the EPA Title VI Interim
Guidance (Interim Guidance) that was released in 1998 for public comment.4'
The Interim Guidance lays out the five-step process that EPA will follow to
evaluate an administratively-filed discrimination complaint alleging disparate
impacts of a pollution permit.42 First, EPA identifies the affected population
that will suffer the adverse impacts of the activity in question. Second, EPA
determines the demographics, i.e. the ethnic and racial composition of the
affected population. Third, EPA establishes the universe of facilities and total
affected populations for purposes of the analysis. As the fourth step, EPA
conducts the disparate impact analysis, which includes a comparison of the
racial and ethnic characteristics within the affected population.43 However,
the only types of impacts that the Interim Guidance considers are those that
are cognizable under the grant recipient's permitting program." The fifth, and
final, step is to determine the significance of the disparity utilizing
arithmetical or statistical analyses.45 Once a finding of disparate impact has
been made (the initial finding of non-compliance in EPA's administrative
process), the grant recipient at issue may either rebut the disparate impact
finding or propose a plan for mitigating the disparate impact."6 However, the
grant recipient may also respond to a disparate impact finding by invoking "a
substantial, legitimate interest that justifies the decision to proceed with the
permit notwithstanding the disparate impact."47
This last provision is probably the most striking aspect of the Interim
Guidance-the availability of a justification defense when a regulatory
decision is found to have a discriminatory impact. Under this provision, the
state or local government agency could raise as a defense for its actions a
"substantial, legitimate interest that justifies the decision to
proceed.., notwithstanding the disparate impact."' The Interim Guidance
states that the sufficiency of the justification necessarily depends on the
particular facts."9 Factors that would be relevant include the seriousness of the
Khristine L. Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REV. 609 (1978).
41. See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING
PERMITS (1998) (last modified Feb. 13, 1998) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/oej/titlevi.html> [hereinafter INTERIM
GUIDANCE].
42. See id.
43. See id,
44. See id
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id
48. Id.
49. See id.
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impact, the certainty of the benefits of the permitted facility, and the extent to
which benefits of the permitted facility would flow back to the impacted
community."
It is apparent from the lack of clarity in the language that EPA is seeking
to preserve for itself maximum flexibility in future dealings with justification
defense claims, and unfortunately, its exact parameters will remain unknown
until EPA applies it. Of course, there can be virtue in leaving difficult issues
for resolution at a later time. However, it seems to me that there is so much
uncertainty and ambiguity here that the justification defense could be
interpreted at its outer boundaries to include jobs, tax dollars, and other
economic development goals. Thus, EPA has not explicitly foreclosed the
specter of state or local governments seeking to trade the health or lives of a
poor or minority community in return for tax dollars or jobs. Simply put, the
justification defense spells out an enormous amount of trouble and in many
ways threatens to eviscerate the integrity of EPA's Title VI regulations as a
means of vindicating environmental justice claims.
Yet, my point here is not to place blame with EPA staff for the way the
Interim Guidance turned out. Recognizing that EPA is governed by an
interest-balancing paradigm leaves one with the inescapable suspicion that
such an outcome was in many ways unavoidable. EPA may be incapable of
simply adopting a rights-maximizing approach no matter how faithful and
committed it is to setting the protection of public health and the environment
as its first priority. In fact, for EPA to have done otherwise, for instance, to
expressly limit or omit the availability of such a justification defense, would
probably have been politically untenable5 or prompted legal challenges. 2
Unfortunately, all of this does not provide much comfort for the prospects of
the environmental justice movement.
50. See id.
51. Not surprisingly, of course, there has been a considerable amount of opposition not only to
EPA's Title VI guidance but also to its environmental justice initiative more generally. See, e.g., Cheryl
Hogue, Permits Challenged in Rights Complaints Remain in Effect, EPA Official Testifies, 29 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 798, 799 (Aug. 14, 1998); Western Governors'Association Joins Calls for EPA to Withdraw Civil
Rights Guidance, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 570 (July 10, 1998).
52. In fact, ajustification defense appears to be required under Title VI case law, though its exact
scope is unclear in this context. See, e.g., Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394 (1 lth
Cir. 1993). However, to explore the extent of the reach of the justification provisions is beyond the scope
of this Essay. Suffice it to say that any justification raised to defeat a finding of disparate impact ought to
require more than a restatement of the reasons for constructing the facility in the first instance, which
usually includes economic considerations. Any rationale raised by a government defendant to take
advantage of the justification factor ought to satisfy a closer means-end test. In other words, there must be
some closer relationship between the proffered justification and the environmental goals served by the state
program--or else, EPA's Title VI administrative regulations would become meaningless.
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The likelihood of disappointing environmental justice activists with the
Interim Guidance appears to have been confirmed by the recent issuance of
EPA's first administrative Title VI decision in the Select Steel complaint.53
In that administrative complaint, a community church protested the issuance
of a Clean Air Act permit for a proposed steel recycling mini-mill in the
Michigan township of Genesee, in part because of the permit's alleged
discriminatory impact of various air pollutant emissions on minority
residents. 4 EPA rejected the complaint on the grounds that none of the
impacts examined rose to a level that would make them adverse impacts
within the meaning of the Interim Guidance. The rational was that the
emissions resulting from the permit conditions would not violate any EPA
minimum standards or other requirements and would be de minimis in their
incremental impacts.55
While it is unclear what the exact extent of the impact of the additional
emissions would have been, it seems to me that it was inappropriate to dismiss
a Title VI complaint simply because the permit and the additional emissions
would not violate EPA's minimum standards. Of course, federal
environmental minimum standards are presumably set at a level that is
sufficient to protect the public and maybe even to provide for a margin of
safety. However, for EPA to rely on compliance with such federal minimum
standards as an indicator of fairness and equity in environmental protections
seems to gut the Title VI administrative regulations of all their vitality and
promise as an effective remedy for discrimination. After all, if compliance
with federal minimum standards is sufficient, then Title VI would add almost
nothing to the protections that the federal environmental statutes and
regulations (with citizen suits and all) already provide. In effect, the disparity
of burdens would become almost irrelevant. More importantly, this kind of
test neither assures fairness nor non-discrimination in the allocation of
environmental burdens. This does not mean that thresholds for impacts are
not useful or important in judging discrimination claims or that EPA should
53. See Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director Office of Civil Rights, to Father Phil Schmitter &
Sister Joanne Chiaverini, Co-Directors, The St. Francis Prayer Center, and Russell Harding, Director, The
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (Oct. 30, 1998) (last modified Nov. 2, 1998)
<http://www.epa.gov/region5/steelcvr.htm> [hereinafter Goode Letter]; see also Paul Connolly, EPA
Dismisses Complaint on Proposed Steel Plant in Michigan, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1351 (Nov. 6, 1998).
54. See Goode Letter, supra note 53. The demographics of the surrounding neighborhoods also
raised a significant question as to whether those communities had a sufficiently high percentage of members
of racial minority groups to be characterized as minority communities. See David Mastio, EPA Ready to
Clear Flint Mill: It had Become Top Test of Environmental Justice Policy, THE DEr. NEWS, Oct. 30, 1998,
at A l; David Mastio, Research Backs Pollution Bias: New Study of Proposed Flint Steel Mill Shows
Affected Population is Mostly Black, THE DET. NEWS, Oct. 21, 1998, at B3 [hereinafter Mastio, Research
Backs Pollution Bias].
55. See Goode Letter, supra note 53.
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have necessarily decided in favor of the complainants. However, the summary
dismissal of the claims by reference to compliance with federal requirements,
especially considering the precedential impact of its decision, seems simplistic
at best.5
6
This analysis and example confirm a simple truth that traditional civil
rights advocates have known for a long time-if there are no special
protections for members of groups that have traditionally been under-
represented in the political process, such as people of color or the poor, they
inevitably lose. In the regulatory process, this means that the cards are stacked
against minorities and the poor. Even though interest-balancing is in itself not
an illegitimate decision-making tool, it is generally a losing proposition for the
politically powerless. They can never truly win in this paradigm; instead, any
gains are made only at the grace and mercy of others.
In addition to these criticisms, however, understanding the different
paradigms also allows us to make at least one pragmatic suggestion that will
further environmental justice goals generally. Rights frequently protect
interests and values that are difficult to quantify or otherwise may be
incommensurable. It is their incommensurable nature that usually leads to
their exclusion from cost-benefit or related interest-balancing analysis. Thus,
traditional environmental decision-making that focuses on costs and benefits
fails to look at interests such as autonomy, fairness, and equality beyond the
minimum legal requirements. These are concerns that pervade constitutional
legal theory and scholarship. It is the very failure to look beyond the numbers
of cost-benefit analysis to such incommensurable values that is at the root of
environmental justice claims. Regardless of whether a rights-based or an
interest-balancing approach is the appropriate means of addressing
environmental justice claims, incorporating such incommensurable values and
interests into environmental regulatory decisions can be a pragmatic way of
advancing environmental justice concerns. Of course, such values and
interests cannot simply be merged into a mathematical cost-benefit analysis.
Instead, incorporating such values and interests needs to occur through the
more traditional freestanding, all-inclusive balancing of interests that
government officials engage in when using discretionary authority to arrive
at a decision that promotes the public interest.
56. While an attempt to set out a framework for evaluating disparate impact claims under Title
VI is outside of the scope of this Essay, I would suggest a more flexible approach which would include
considerations, such as autonomy and community preservation, that are traditionally not taken into account
in the siting process for polluting facilities. Of course, here, the demographics of the communities
surrounding the facility may have been an independent ground for EPA to decide that no Title VI claim
existed. See Mastio, Research Backs Pollution Bias, supra note 54, at B3.
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One objection that immediately might be raised is the lack of expertise
and competence of technical agencies, such as EPA, to consider
incommensurable values and interests. While a detailed response is outside
of the scope of this Essay, there is no reason why technical environmental
agencies should not begin to develop such expertise or why politically elected
and non-technical agency officials should be per se incompetent to weigh such
considerations. In fact, agencies managing natural resources frequently deal
with incommensurable values, such as aesthetic and extrinsic values, in the
context of regulatory decision-making under the Endangered Species Act57 or
even the National Historic Preservation Act. 8 Furthermore, existing statutes,
such as the NEPA59 arguably already require such a comprehensive approach
to environmental decision-making.6  In this sense, requiring traditional
political balancing returns governmental decision-making from technocratic
control to the responsibility of non-technical policy makers, politicians or
career bureaucrats, who oversee most other aspects of government regulation.
What this means in practical terms is that politicians and bureaucrats should
not, and cannot, be allowed to blindly rely on technocratic judgments or hide
behind scientific analysis.6
Executive Order 12,898,62 which requires the general recognition of the
importance of environmental justice considerations in federal agency decision-
making, is helpful and constitutes a significant step in this direction by
alluding to incommensurable factors and by promoting public participation.
However, to fully implement the Executive Order's mandates, it is insufficient
for federal agencies, such as EPA, to stop at discrimination analysis. Instead,
additional steps ought to be taken, such as articulating the incommensurable
values and interests relevant in environmental decision-making in specific
57. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
58. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (1994).
59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d.
60. Of course, most of EPA's regulatory actions are not subject to NEPA's requirements by virtue
of the functional equivalence doctrine. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States EPA,
489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding FIFRA procedures to be the functional equivalent of NEPA);
Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349,359 (3rd Cir. 1972) (explaining that Clean Air Act procedure
should be used instead of NEPA). EPA has promulgated guidance for incorporating environmental justice
concerns into the NEPA analysis that EPA must engage in for those activities that are not covered by the
functional equivalence doctrine. See OFFICE OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES, U.S. EPA, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS iN EPA's NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSIs (1998) (last
visited March 8, 1999) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ofa/ejepa.html>. Like Executive Order 12,898, see infra
note 62 and accompanying text, the guidance is a helpful important step, but not enough to address
environmental justice concerns.
61. In this respect, increased public participation by poor and minority communities is an
important means of assuring that public officials do not blindly rely on technocratic judgments to make
decisions about the environment.
62. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
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regulations and internal agency guidance. Only by formalizing consideration
of these interests, ideally by putting them on equal footing with other technical
requirements in the decision-making process, can environmental justice
concerns be addressed effectively rather than being dealt with as a haphazard
afterthought responding to community activism.
Of course, most ideal for the environmental justice movement would be
utilization of the rights-maximizing approach, though that is unlikely to
happen anytime soon. However, by forcing the recognition of the
incommensurable interests and values implicated in environmental decisions,
including autonomy, equity and such spiritual values as community ties,63
decision-making can be improved. It is a pragmatic first step.
As I mentioned at the outset of this Essay, I did not intend to offer any
comprehensive solution that will address the problems raised here. However,
by focusing on the mismatch between the underlying decision-making
paradigms-rights-maximizing and interest-balancing-I hope to provide
some important insights into both our understanding of the obstacles that
environmental justice advocates have faced in pressing their claims and the
resulting prospects of success for future environmental justice litigation. Most
importantly, a better understanding of the tensions underlying the approaches
to civil rights and environmental law ought to lead to the development of
strategies that will vindicate environmental justice goals more effectively in
the long run.
63. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Potential Misfit Between Equity
and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 871 (1992); Reich, supra note 5, at 287.
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